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TOWARD A REALITY-BASED ESTATE TAX 
WENDY C. GERZOG* 
Abstract: Currently, the estate tax does not accurately value the property and 
transactions that it is meant to cover. Additionally, the marital and charitable 
deductions do not reflect actual associated transfers, instead skewing their 
benefits away from their purported beneficiaries. This Article proposes re-
forming the estate tax by eliminating these sources of unreality and distortion, 
and to make the current estate tax a reality-based tax. Through six specific 
proposals, the Article identifies solutions to the problems associated with tes-
tamentary transfers, puts forth alternative methods of valuation to prevent 
gaming of transfer taxes, and offers significant modifications to two deduction 
provisions. 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article proposes reforming the estate tax by eliminating devices 
and distortions that have crept into the estate tax and frustrated its goal. The 
present focus in reforming the estate tax is to make the current estate tax a 
reality-based tax. This means that the estate tax should encompass testa-
mentary property transfers at their real values, and the marital and charita-
ble deductions should reflect actual marital and charitable transfers. 
The biggest sources of unreality and distortion include omitting certain 
common testamentary transfers, allowing valuation games to defeat the im-
pact of transfer taxes, and skewing the major benefits of certain deductions 
away from their purported beneficiaries. Therefore, Part I of this Article 
focuses on the problems associated with testamentary transfers, specifically 
involving life insurance, will substitutes, and retained powers.1 Part II pro-
poses alternative methods of valuation to prevent gaming of transfer taxes.2 
Part III proposes that certain deduction provisions be either repealed or 
changed.3 
I. TESTAMENTARY TRANSFERS 
Because of the many benefits associated with gift-giving, such as the 
annual exclusion, as well as the tax-exclusive nature of the gift tax, and the 
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 1 See infra notes 4–65 and accompanying text. 
 2 See infra notes 66–94 and accompanying text. 
 3 See infra notes 95–114 and accompanying text. 
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benefit of value freezing,4 Congress has historically tried to prevent inher-
ently testamentary transfers from receiving those tax advantages.5 Those 
measures have failed to ensure that some of those inherently testamentary 
transfers are included in the decedent’s estate at their date of death values, 
either because of case law or inadequate safeguards in the statutes. Thus, 
section A of this Part proposes changes to the taxation of life insurance pro-
ceeds.6 Section B proposes an amendment to § 2036.7 Section C addresses 
the consequences of eliminating certain powers from inclusion in a dece-
dent’s estate.8 
A. Life Insurance on Decedent’s Life Indirectly Funded by Decedent 
In trying to grapple with the issue of inherently testamentary property, 
Congress and the courts have developed estate tax laws that have become 
counterproductive. A prime example of this consequence is that the pro-
ceeds of life insurance on decedent’s life, paid for with decedent’s funds, 
are rarely taxed in decedent’s estate. With a common estate-planning device 
most of those life insurance proceeds are in fact exempt. This is because of 
the interplay of a couple of estate tax statutes9 and because of changes made 
to the insurance inclusion statute.10 
                                                                                                                           
 4 See Wendy C. Gerzog, A Simpler Verifiable Gift Tax, 6 COLUM. J. TAX. L. 182, 201–06 
(2015) (describing benefits associated with making gifts). 
 5 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 2035 (a)–(b) (2012) (adjusting value of estate for certain gifts made within 
three years of decedent’s death); id. § 2701 (2012) (creating special valuation rules for transferring 
interests in corporations or partnerships). 
 6 See infra notes 9–36 and accompanying text. 
 7 See infra notes 37–60 and accompanying text. 
 8 See infra notes 61–65 and accompanying text. 
 9 See generally Estate of Leder v. Comm’r, 89 T.C. 235 (1987) (interpreting the amended 
I.R.C. §§ 2035, 2042), aff’d, 893 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1989), action on dec., 1991-012 (July 3, 
1991); Estate of Headrick v. Comm’r, 918 F.2d 1263 (6th Cir. 1990) (same). Thus, the sole inci-
dents of ownership test paved the way for the viability of irrevocable life insurance trusts (ILIT); 
that is, the current literal language of § 2042 provides a loophole for the decedent’s paid life insur-
ance to escape estate taxation. See Estate of Headrick, 918 F.2d at 1267–68 (analyzing the literal 
language of § 2042 to exclude certain life insurance proceeds from decedent’s taxable estate). 
There is not much criticism of ILITs; that may be because of not only the insurance lobby but also 
the fact that ILITs provide liquidity for an estate, which in turn means a quick source of funds for 
estate tax payments. 
 10 Between 1942 and 1954, § 2042 required estate tax inclusion of life insurance on the dece-
dent’s life either because the decedent possessed any incidents of ownership in the policy or the 
decedent paid the insurance premiums. See JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXES ON GRA-
TUITOUS TRANSFERS: LAW AND PLANNING 240 (2011) [hereinafter FEDERAL TAXES ON GRATUI-
TOUS TRANSFERS]. In 1954, however, the premium payment test was abandoned in order to allow 
the decedent to avoid estate tax inclusion if the decedent had transferred all incidents of ownership 
more than three years before death. See id. at 240–41. Moreover, the payment of premiums within 
three years of death no longer affects inclusion of the proceeds under § 2035(a) because the 
“beamed transfer” of premium payments was eliminated as a basis for inclusion under that I.R.C. 
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Currently, inclusion in decedent’s estate is the subject of gaming 
through the creation of an irrevocable life insurance trust (“ILIT”).11 Liter-
ally, under the estate tax statute, because the decedent never owned any of 
the incidents of ownership in the policy, because the trust—although em-
powered to—does not have to purchase life insurance on the decedent’s life, 
and because the insurance proceeds do not pass to the estate, the life insur-
ance proceeds in an ILIT are not taxed in the decedent’s estate.12 Further, 
through the use of another fiction referred to as Crummey powers,13 the de-
cedent’s lifetime transfers to the ILIT, which are made in order to pay the 
life insurance premiums, are further minimized for gift tax purposes.14 Thus 
today, informed taxpayers create an ILIT, designate the beneficiaries of the 
trust—basically, the beneficiaries of the insurance proceeds—and are the 
source of premium payments. By means of an ILIT, the taxpayer effectively 
and legally evades estate taxes. 
The current approach to life insurance is the result of years of legisla-
tive change. The 1939 Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”) contained a premi-
um payment test that required that any portion of the proceeds from life in-
surance policies on the decedent’s life purchased directly or indirectly in 
premiums paid by the decedent were includible in decedent’s estate.15 Ex-
                                                                                                                           
section in 1981. See Estate of Leder, 89 T.C. at 239–44 & n.12 (recognizing that § 2035(b) “pre-
cludes any consideration of the 3-year rule”). 
 11 See William S. Huff, The Irrevocable Life Insurance Trust, 38 ARK. L. REV. 139, 139–41 
(1984) (“Its primary purpose is to eliminate the insurance death proceeds from the grantor’s gross 
estate for federal estate tax purposes.”); Donald O. Jansen, Giving Birth to, Caring for, and Feed-
ing the Irrevocable Life Insurance Trust, 41 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 571, 573–76 (2006) 
(“Properly drafted, the life insurance trust can be a vehicle for removing the insurance proceeds 
from the estates of the insured and insured’s spouse for federal estate tax purposes.”). 
 12 See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text (describing the tax characteristics of ILITs). 
 13 Crummey v. Comm’r, 397 F.2d 82, 86–96 (9th Cir. 1968) (granting a tax exclusion for 
certain trust property distributed under a demand right); see Mikel v. Comm’r, 109 T.C.M. (CCH) 
1355, 12–13, 20–21 (2015) (granting petitioners’ tax exclusion for gift to a “Crummey trust” be-
cause the trust beneficiaries’ had an unconditional right to withdraw property which could not be 
legally resisted by the trustees); see also Estate of Cristofani v. Comm’r, 97 T.C. 74, 79–83 (1991) 
(adopting the test in Crummey). Crummey powers allow the holder to withdraw a limited amount 
of money; generally “the lesser of (a) the amount (if any) transferred to the trust by the grantor 
during that year or (b) an amount equal to the maximum annual exclusion.” FEDERAL TAX ON 
GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS, supra note 10, at 131. In order to create the most benefit, the settlor 
creates “hanging” powers, which can gradually absorb the full annual exclusion amount without 
causing a lapse. Id. at 330–31. 
 14 See generally Bradley E.S. Fogel, The Emperor Does Not Need Clothes—The Expanding 
Use of “Naked” Crummey Withdrawal Powers to Obtain Federal Gift Tax Annual Exclusions, 73 
TUL. L. REV. 555 (1998) (explaining the history and practical effect of Crummey powers). 
 15 I.R.C. § 811(g) (1939). At that time § 811(g) also required, as does the current statute, that 
any proceeds from life insurance on decedent’s life that were receivable by the estate or any life 
insurance on decedent’s life on which decedent held the incidents of ownership at this death are 
includible in the decedent’s estate. See id.; see also I.R.C. § 2042 (2012). Regarding the 1939 
provision, in order to determine the amount includible when the decedent paid a portion of the 
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plaining the reaction to this provision, the Joint Committee on Internal Rev-
enue Taxation stated that many taxpayers considered this provision to be 
unfair where owners transfer all of the incidents of ownership in the policy 
during their lifetimes.16 Specifically, taxpayers argued for change because 
of the hardship imposed in the context of business partnerships. Hardships 
arose in partnership agreements that required the purchase of life insurance 
to allow the surviving partners to purchase a deceased partner’s interest.17 
As a result, in 1954 the new § 2042 eliminated the payment of premiums 
rule18 despite the recognition at that time that such a change would cost 
about $25 million in fiscal year 1955.19 
In 1955 a group of prominent American Law Institute (“ALI”) scholars 
met and discussed the issue of life insurance.20 The group “adopted the in-
termediate rule that the difference between the cash surrender value and the 
face amount of the policy would be included in the gross estate to the extent 
that the insured had paid the premiums.”21 One scholar described the 1939 
statute as replicating the treatment of a retained life interest or power, caus-
ing fair market value date of death inclusion of the insurance proceeds.22 
Another commentator emphasized that insurance not only is a transfer at 
                                                                                                                           
premiums before decedent transferred the policy as a gift to another, the provision explained that 
the amount includible reflects the same ratio as decedent’s contributions bear to all paid premi-
ums. Id. § 811(g)(2). 
 16 JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 83D CONG., PRELIMINARY DIGEST OF 
SUGGESTIONS FOR INTERNAL REVENUE REVISION SUBMITTED TO THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON IN-
TERNAL REVENUE TAXATION 109 (Comm. Print 1953) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY DIGEST], https://
ia600304.us.archive.org/15/items/preliminarydiges353unit/preliminarydiges353unit.pdf [https://perma.
cc/N56R-X4YB]. The Joint Committee states: 
[The taxpayers] state that where a decedent has paid premiums on a life-insurance 
policy on his life but subsequently divests himself completely of any incidents of 
ownership of such policy by either assignment or gift, there exists no logical reason 
to include the insurance proceeds in his estate to the extent of the premiums he paid 
prior to the transfer. They indicate that the present rule imposes unnecessary obsta-
cles in the use of life insurance in partnership agreements for the purpose of permit-
ting surviving partners to buy out the deceased partner’s interest. It has therefore 
been proposed that the payment of premiums test should be eliminated. 
Id. Other remarks favored an exclusion of varying amounts ranging up to $100,000. Id. 
 17 See id. (describing the complaint made by taxpayers). 
 18 See H.R. REP. NO. 1337-83, at A316–17 (1954) (Conf. Rep.) (explaining revisions to 
§ 811(g) made by § 2042); S. REP. NO. 1622-83, at 124 (1954) (Conf. Rep.) (same). 
 19 H.R. REP. NO. 1337-83, at 91; S. REP. NO. 1622-83, at 124. 
 20 See AM. LAW INST., PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-SECOND ANNUAL MEETING OF THE 
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 101–120 (1955) (discussing Estate and Gift Tax Statute, Tentative 
Draft No. 10), reprinted in STANLEY S. SURREY ET AL., FEDERAL WEALTH-TRANSFER TAXA-
TION: CASES AND MATERIALS 593, 593–605 (3d ed. 1987). 
 21 Id. at 594. 
 22 Id. at 595. 
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death, but also has added value created by death, establishing life insurance 
as the most testamentary asset of any taxpayer.23 
Life insurance on decedent’s life is also viewed as an example of a 
type of valuation freeze: the value of a policy during the decedent’s lifetime 
is not equal to the proceeds payable at death. Thus, a gift of a life insurance 
policy is valued at the interpolated reserve value and not at the present dis-
counted value of the proceeds.24 Moreover, the investment growth during 
the decedent’s life is not taxed for income tax purposes25 and proceeds paid 
to beneficiaries at decedent’s death are not includible in the income of either 
the beneficiary or the estate.26 
In 1981 Congress was concerned with valuation freezing of life insur-
ance on the decedent’s life when it amended I.R.C. § 2035.27 Under the uni-
fication of the gift and estate taxes and their unified rates and exemptions in 
1976,28 Congress realized that including “deathbed” gifts in the decedent’s 
estate was no longer necessary in most cases.29 Where, however, the valua-
tion increase in certain lifetime transfers was disproportionately large, Con-
                                                                                                                           
 23 Id. at 599. Specifically referring to the “gambling” factor, the excerpt states: 
[T]he insurance risk element for which the decedent was paying—that is the value 
that springs into being after death. I can’t imagine anything that is more fundamen-
tally testamentary than that value, and I feel that if the decedent is the one who paid 
for that value, that amount should be in his estate. 
Id. 
 24 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-6(a) (2015) (stating rule for the valuation of certain life insur-
ance contracts). A gift of a life insurance policy is valued at the cost of similar policies—the re-
placement cost—or at the interpolated terminal reserve value. Id. 
 25 FEDERAL TAX ON GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS, supra note 10, at 234. 
 26 I.R.C. § 101 (2012). 
 27 See Economic Recovery Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 424, 95 Stat. 172, 317 (amend-
ing § 2035 to exclude from decedent’s estate certain gifts made within three years of decedent’s 
death). 
 28 See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2001, 90 Stat. 1520, 1846–1850 (creat-
ing a unified rate schedule for estate and gift taxes). 
 29 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC 
RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, at 262 (1981), available at https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?
func=startdown&id=2397 [https://perma.cc/F5J3-P2C8] (“The Congress concluded that inclusion 
of such appreciation generally is unnecessary, except for gifts of certain property included in the 
gross estate pursuant to certain of the so-called transfer sections (secs. 2036, 2037, 2038, 2041, 
and 2042).”). “Deathbed” gifts are either gifts in contemplation of death or within three years of 
decedent’s death. See id. at 261–62 (describing tax consequences of gifts made “in contemplation 
of death”). The 1976 Act amended I.R.C. § 2035 to include all gifts made within three years of the 
decedent’s death. Tax Reform Act of 1976 § 2001. Prior to that legislation, motivation determined 
inclusion. See id. (amending § 2035 for gifts made “in contemplation of death”). See generally 
Gina B. Kennedy, Note, Section 2035: Taxation of Gifts Made Within Three Years of Death, 19 
B.C. L. REV. 577 (1978) (explaining the revisions made to § 2035 by the Tax Reform Act of 
1976). 
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gress retained exceptions under the revised statute.30 Prominent among 
those exceptions is the rule for life insurance.31 
The current proposal to tax life insurance in decedent’s estate is to 
amend § 2035 and § 2042. At a minimum, § 2035 should be amended to 
include in decedent’s estate the full date of death proceeds of life insurance 
on the decedent’s life to the extent to which the decedent has paid, directly 
or indirectly, insurance premiums within three years of his death. That 
should include any transfers by decedent to a trust within three years of 
death that in fact can be traced to the payment of life insurance premiums 
on decedent’s life. That change to § 2035 would equate inherently testamen-
tary life insurance on decedent’s life in an ILIT with a transfer of life insur-
ance within three years of decedent’s death and with the other testamentary 
transfers that highly appreciate at death, which currently are the focus of 
that I.R.C. section.32 
Optimally, however, § 2042 should be amended to include all life in-
surance on decedent’s life to the extent to which decedent at any time, di-
rectly or indirectly (e.g., through any trust), paid the premiums during his life-
time and wherein at any time during his lifetime decedent directly or indirect-
ly irrevocably selected the beneficiary of the policy.33 Section 2035 and 
§ 2042 should also specify that any payments by decedent’s employer, par-
alleling § 2039,34 are to be considered payments by the decedent. 
                                                                                                                           
 30 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 29, at 262 (“For example, if one year prior to 
death, a decedent transferred any incident of ownership in a life insurance policy to a third party, 
the entire amount of the proceeds will be included in the decedent’s gross estate pursuant to sec-
tions 2035 and 2042.”). 
 31 See Kennedy, supra note 29, at 594 (discussing the exception for life insurance). Not only 
is a gift of the insurance policy included under the three year rule of § 2035, but also the transfer 
of even one final retained incidence of ownership in that policy will cause inclusion under the 
1981 version of that statute. Economic Recovery Act of 1981 § 424. 
 32 See I.R.C. § 2035. The statute and regulations include life insurance proceeds in decedent’s 
estate where the decedent transfers life insurance on decedent’s own life or releases any of the 
policy’s incidents of ownership within three years of death. See id. § 2035(a)(2); Treas. Reg. 
§ 20.2042-1(c)(2) (2015). The regulation defines incidents of ownership as: 
[T]he right of the insured or his estate to the economic benefits of the policy. Thus, 
it includes the power to change the beneficiary, to surrender or cancel the policy, to 
assign the policy, to revoke an assignment, to pledge the policy for a loan, or to ob-
tain from the insurer a loan against the surrender value of the policy . . . . 
Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(2). Likewise, I.R.C. § 2035(a)(2) subjects to estate tax a transfer or 
release of an interest or power within three years of death that would have caused inclusion in 
decedent’s estate under I.R.C. §§ 2036–2038 if otherwise held at death. 
 33 The statute could be revised more expansively to include life insurance proceeds wherein 
the beneficiary of decedent’s life insurance policy is “a family member” of the decedent, as de-
fined in § 2701(e)(1). See I.R.C. § 2701(e)(1) (2012). Section 2701(e)(1) defines a “member of the 
transferor’s family” as including the transferor’s—here, it would be the decedent’s—spouse, de-
scendants, the spouse’s descendants, and the spouses of any descendant. Id. 
 34 See I.R.C. § 2039(b) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(c) (2015). 
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In an ILIT, the trust holds a life insurance policy on decedent’s life, 
proceeds are paid to beneficiaries of the trust irrevocably named by the de-
cedent, and the proceeds are paid to the ILIT at the decedent’s death. As a 
result, the ILIT is clearly a testamentary device and the value of the pro-
ceeds should be included in the decedent’s estate. In the case of an ILIT, the 
trustee should be responsible for payment of the tax attributable to that es-
tate tax inclusion. Finally, the specific reason for eliminating the premium 
payment test in 1954 was the hardship that could befall the surviving part-
ners in a partnership where insurance is used to supply cash to buy a de-
ceased partner’s interest.35 Assuming that the partnership is carrying on a 
trade or business, the amended statutes should include an exception limited 
to that particular situation.36 
Proposal 1: Except in the instance of a business partnership wherein 
the surviving partners use the insurance proceeds to purchase a deceased 
partner’s interest in the partnership, § 2042 includes life insurance proceeds 
paid on decedent’s life to the extent to which decedent at any time, directly 
or indirectly, paid the premiums on or irrevocably designated the benefi-
ciary or beneficiaries of the policy.  
B. Will Substitutes and Section 2036 
Section 2036 provides that the following types of transfers are essential-
ly testamentary: a lifetime transfer with a grantor-retained life income inter-
est; a lifetime transfer with a grantor-retained current enjoyment over non-
income producing property; or a lifetime transfer with a grantor-retained 
power over lifetime income or enjoyment.37 Those strategies are all consid-
ered “will substitutes” and as such describe inherently testamentary disposi-
                                                                                                                           
 35 See PRELIMINARY DIGEST, supra note 16, at 109 (noting taxpayer opposition to the test 
because of the difficulty imposed on surviving spouses). 
 36 See I.R.C. § 2039(b) (determining amount of annuity includible in gross estate); Treas. 
Reg. § 20.2039-1(c) (creating ratio for amounts to be included in the gross estate under § 2039); 
Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6) (creating rules for attribution of incidents of ownership of a life 
insurance policy on decedent’s life reserved to a corporation). 
 37 See I.R.C. § 2036 (2012) (concerning transfers with a retained life estate); United States v. 
Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316, 320 (1969) (“The general purpose of the statute was to include in a 
decedent’s gross estate transfers that are essentially testamentary—i.e., transfers which leave the 
transferor a significant interest in or control over the property transferred during his lifetime.”); 
Comm’r v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632, 646 (1949) (quoting Goldstone v. United States, 325 
U.S. 687, 690–91 (1945)) (“Testamentary dispositions of an inter vivos nature cannot escape the 
force of this section by hiding behind legal niceties contained in devices and forms created by 
conveyancers.”). Section 2036, and consequently the relevant case law, corresponds with 
§ 811(c)(1)(B) of the 1939 I.R.C. See H.R. REP. NO. 1337-83, at A314. 
1044 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:1037 
tions.38 Thus, the statute requires that the full date of death value of the under-
lying property is to be included in the decedent’s estate. The statute’s history 
is replete with a discussion of the legislative intent to use this provision to 
attack the abuse of converting what are essentially death-time transfers into 
gifts.39 Likewise, Congress wanted to deny taxpayers the ability to freeze the 
value of those transfers as well as other preferences accorded gifts.40 
                                                                                                                           
 38 See Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 114 (1940) (interpreting congressional intent to 
treat certain transfers as will substitutes); see also Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. at 643 (explaining the 
Court’s reasoning in Hallock). 
 39 Congress enacted the predecessor statute to § 2036 in reaction to three Supreme Court 
cases allowing a decedent to avoid estate taxes where he retained for his life a right to enjoy the 
transferred property. See Estate of Church, 335 U.S. at 639–40 (citing Burnet v. N. Tr. Co., 283 
U.S. 782 (1931) (per curiam); McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 784 (1931) (per curiam); Morsman 
v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 783 (1931) (per curiam)). Acting Secretary of the Treasury Ogden Mills stated 
that without quick congressional action to reverse the three Supreme Court opinions tax revenue 
collected would decrease “in excess of one-third of the revenue derived from the Federal estate 
tax, with anticipated refunds in excess of $25,000,000.” Estate of Church, 335 U.S. at 639–40 
(quoting 74 CONG. REC. 7198, 7199 (1931)). Reacting to United States v. Byrum, Congress enact-
ed I.R.C. § 2036(b). Compare Tax Reform Act of 1976 § 2009(a) (treating retention of voting 
rights in retained stock at retention of enjoyment of such stock), with United States v. Byrum, 408 
U.S. 125, 148 (1972) (holding that retention of voting right in stock was not enjoyment of such 
stock). Subsequent to Byrum, Congress determined that: 
[T]he voting rights are so significant with respect to corporate stock that the reten-
tion of voting rights by a donor should be treated as the retention of the enjoyment 
of the stock for estate tax purposes . . . [and] that this treatment is necessary to pre-
vent the avoidance of the estate and gift taxes. 
H. REP. NO. 94-1380, at 64 (1976); JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 94TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANA-
TION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, at 589 (Comm. Print 1976), available at https://ia600308.
us.archive.org/29/items/generalexplanati00jcs3376/generalexplanati00jcs3376.pdf [https://perma.
cc/UC7B-26XM]. Likewise, in response to the increased use of valuation freezes in estate plan-
ning, Congress enacted I.R.C. § 2036(c). See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. 
No. 101-203, § 10402(a), 100 Stat. 1330-1, 1330-431 (amending I.R.C. § 2036). The statute was 
amended to be applicable to decedents dying after 1987, but only with respect to transfers subse-
quent to December 17, 1987. Id. As to the problem of estate freezes, the Joint Committee on Taxa-
tion stated: 
Estate freezes raise three basic transfer tax concerns. First, because frozen interests 
are inherently difficult to value, they can be used as a means of undervaluing gifts. 
Second, such interests entail the creation of rights that, if not exercised in an arm’s-
length manner, may subsequently be used to transfer wealth free of transfer tax. 
Third, ‘“frozen”‘ interests may be used to retain substantial ownership of the entire 
property while nominally transferring an interest in the property to another person. 
JOINT. COMM. ON TAXATION, 101ST CONG., FEDERAL TRANSFER TAX CONSEQUENCES OF ESTATE 
FREEZES 17 (Comm. Print 1990); see Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
508, § 11601, 104 Stat. 1388-1, 1388-490 (repealing the 1987 enactment of I.R.C. § 2036(c)). 
 40 See supra note 39 (explaining tax concerns surrounding tax freezes). The gift tax is a tax-
exclusive tax, unlike the estate tax, which is a tax-inclusive tax. Gerzog, supra note 4, at 202–03. 
The difference between the two tax systems is that the estate tax computes the tax inclusive of the 
amount that will be paid to the government, whereas the gift tax computes the tax based only on 
the net amount that the beneficiary receives. Id. 
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In 1990, however, reflecting a desire to have the gift tax rules, instead 
of the estate tax provisions, deal with those valuation distortions, Congress 
replaced § 2036(c) with the special valuation rules in §§ 2701–2704.41 
Since the enactment of the special valuation rules, a majority of courts have 
determined that what constitutes “adequate and full consideration” under 
§ 2036 in the sale of a remainder interest in property, wherein the decedent 
has retained a life interest, is the economic value of the remainder interest 
as calculated under the actuarial tables.42 Although apparently sound rea-
soning, this economic equivalent position ignores the inherently testamen-
tary nature of those transfers and the fundamental policy rationale under-
pinning § 2036. 
In 1995, in Estate of D’Ambrosio v. Commissioner, the decedent and 
her son owned a closely held company, Valparo, which at that time had only 
issued one class of stock: common stock.43 The company was recapitalized 
in 1983, after which it held both common and preferred classes of stock, 
with the common stock assigned future appreciation.44 Between that time in 
1983 and September 1, 1987, decedent transferred all of her common stock 
and retained only 470 shares of her noncumulative convertible preferred 
shares.45 On September 1, 1987, when she was eighty years old, the dece-
dent and Valparo agreed that the company would buy her remainder interest 
in those shares in return for an annuity of $296,039 per year.46 On May 25, 
1990, fewer than three years after the agreed transaction, decedent died hav-
ing received $592,078 in annuity payments.47 At the time of the sale, as well 
as at the time of her death, the fair market value of the 470 shares of Val-
                                                                                                                           
 41 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 §§ 11601–11602(a); see JOINT COMM. ON TAX-
ATION, 101ST CONG., COMPARISON OF REVENUE PROVISIONS OF H.R. 5835 (REVENUE RECONCILI-
ATION ACT OF 1990), at 46 (Comm. Print 1990), available at https://www.jct.gov/publications.
html?func=download&id=3225&chk=3225&no_html=1 [https://perma.cc/WHF9-K8JQ] (“The Sen-
ate amendment repeals section 2036(c) retroactively and provides in its place rules generally intended 
to assure more accurate gift tax valuation of the initial transfer.”). 
 42 See, e.g., Estate of Magnin v. Comm’r, 184 F.3d 1074, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999) (determining 
that “adequate and full consideration” is measured by the actuarial value of the remainder inter-
est); Wheeler v. United States, 116 F.3d 749, 767 (5th Cir. 1997) (same); Estate of D’Ambrosio v. 
Comm’r, 105 T.C. 252 (1995), rev’d, 101 F.3d 309, 311–12 (3d Cir. 1996) (same). Those courts 
rejected the interpretation of Gradow v. United States. Compare Gradow v. United States, 11 Cl. 
Ct. 808, 813–14 (1987) (requiring a full fair market value of the underlying property to allow 
escape from the reach of § 2036, as estate tax inclusion under that I.R.C. section requires the full 
date-of-death value of the underlying property), aff’d, 897 F.2d 516 (Fed. Cir. 1990), with Estate 
of Magnin, 184 F.3d at 1077–78 (rejecting the holding of Gradow), and Wheeler, 116 F.3d at 756 
(declining to apply the rationale of Gradow), and Estate of D’Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 314 (rejecting 
the holding of Gradow). 
 43 Estate of D’Ambrosio, 105 T.C. at 253. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 253–54. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
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paro was $2,350,000. Under the actuarial tables, the annuity’s value was 
$1,324,014.48 
The facts in the case were fully stipulated and the only issue before the 
court was whether Valparo had paid “full and adequate consideration in 
money or money’s worth” to except the transfer from the full date of death 
value inclusion under § 2036(a)(1), less the value of any consideration de-
cedent had received.49 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit re-
versed the Tax Court, which had held in favor of the government, and held 
that the exception in the statute applied: Valparo had paid the full actuarially 
determined value of the remainder interest in decedent’s preferred stock.50 
Although the value paid was the actuarial value of the remainder, that value 
would not indicate the inherently testamentary nature of transfer.51 If § 2036 
had applied the full date of death value of the full underlying fee simple 
property would have been included in her estate because of the testamentary 
nature of the transfer, despite the fact that the decedent held no interest in 
the property at her death. On a purely economic analysis, § 2036 makes no 
sense; on its policy basis of preventing tax evasion, however, it makes per-
fect sense. Someone who transfers a future interest in property to her child 
but retains the current enjoyment creates the split interest only to obscure 
the fact that she actually enjoys her property until her death when her child 
takes possession. 
In D’Ambrosio, we first see a parent transferring future value to her 
family in a corporate reorganization, which after 1990 would likely have 
resulted in a gift of the full value of the company under § 2701. She trans-
fers all future appreciation by transferring the common stock to her family 
during her lifetime. At the same time, as she ages, she would like to avoid 
the testamentary function of § 2036 and she understands that she only needs 
an annuity interest for her expenses before her death. Perhaps she also un-
derstands that at eighty years old her health is worse than the average 
eighty-year-old.52 Consequently the decedent uses another estate-planning 
strategy to devalue her remaining shares, one that allows her a fixed income 
and indirectly allows her to sell her remaining shares to her son for what her 
lawyer may suggest will be at a fraction of its value. By selling a partial 
interest (a remainder) in the property to Valparo, the strategy aims to pre-
                                                                                                                           
 48 Id. The government conceded that the value included in the decedent’s estate should be the 
value of the stock ($2,350,000) less the value of the annuity ($1,324,014), and not merely the 
actual amounts paid to the decedent ($592,078). Id. at 254. 
 49 Estate of D’Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 311–12. 
 50 Id. at 311–14. 
 51 See id. at 311–16 (discussing valuation and the nature of the transfer). 
 52 She benefits from adverse selection because she has special knowledge of the state of her 
health, tipping the actuarial tables in her economic favor. 
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vent the natural application of full date-of-death estate tax inclusion under 
the abuse prevention provision—§ 2036. 
By having her and her son’s company buy an annuity for her in ex-
change for the value of the remainder interest in the company’s stock, and 
instead of having $2,350,000 included in her estate, their company in theory 
paid about half that amount ($1,324,014), as calculated by the actuarial ta-
bles, for the annuity.53 In actuality the company spent $592,078—all for 
about one quarter of that § 2036 date-of-death figure.54 
In D’Ambrosio, the Third Circuit ignored the role of adverse selection 
and the inaccuracy of the actuarial tables when it offered the following ex-
ample to support its economic equivalence interpretation of the bona fide 
sale exception in the statute: 
Assume that a decedent sells his son a remainder interest in . . . 
Blackacre, which is worth $1 million in fee simple, for its actuar-
ial fair market value of $100,000 (an amount which implicitly in-
cludes the market value of Blackacre’s expected appreciation). 
Decedent then invests the proceeds of the sale. If the rates of re-
turn for both assets are equal and decedent lives exactly as long 
as the actuarial tables predict, the consideration that decedent 
received for his remainder will equal the value of Blackacre on 
the date of his death . . . . We therefore have great difficulty un-
derstanding how this transaction could be abusive.55 
The court’s example neglects to acknowledge that: (1) The actuarial 
tables are more often inaccurate than a true reflection of actual values in 
any particular circumstance, in part because they assume a constant interest 
rate over the term equal to the initial month’s interest rate and in part be-
cause they ignore capital appreciation;56 (2) because the taxpayer has inti-
                                                                                                                           
 53 Estate of D’Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 311. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 316–17 (emphasis added). 
 56 See Estate of Cook v. Comm’r, 349 F.3d 850, 854 (5th Cir. 2003) (“In enacting 
§ 7520(a)(1) and requiring valuation by the tables, Congress displayed a preference for conven-
ience and certainty over accuracy in the individual case.”). By statute, with very few exceptions, 
split interest values must be determined under the actuarial tables. See Technical and Miscellane-
ous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 5031(a), 102 Stat. 3342, 3668–69 (codified at 
I.R.C. § 7520 (2012)) (mandating use of valuation tables). Even before the enactment of § 7520, 
case law directed that split temporal interests be valued by the tables. Ithaca Tr. Co. v. Comm’r, 
279 U.S. 151, 155 (1929). Section 7520(c)(2) requires that interest rates be published monthly, 
implicitly acknowledging that interest rates will probably vary over any actual term of years. 
I.R.C.A. § 7520(c)(2) (West 2014). Likewise, compounding the tables’ inaccuracies, the princi-
pal’s growth during a stated term is ignored for valuation by means of the tables. See Wendy C. 
Gerzog, Annuity Tables Versus Factually Based Estate Tax Valuation: Ithaca Trust Revisited, 38 
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 745, 752 & n.46 (2004) (discussing the shortcomings of the valuation 
tables). 
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mate knowledge of personal variables, such as poor health, the taxpayer 
only utilizes split interest planning strategies57 like the one in D’Ambrosio 
when the probabilities favor the use of the actuarial tables—i.e., when the 
application of the tables is not neutral;58 and (3) transactions among unre-
lated third parties do not usually involve voluntarily splitting fee simple 
interests into different temporal interests.59 
Section 2036, reflecting the policy reasons for its enactment and appli-
cation, requires inclusion in decedent’s estate of the fair market value of the 
underlying property at the decedent’s death.60 At a minimum, any sale for 
less than the full value of the underlying property within three years of de-
cedent’s death should be included in the decedent’s estate, and § 2035 
should be amended accordingly. 
Optimally, however, in order to avoid any ambiguity and to stem 
abuse, § 2036 should be amended to define what interest is to be valued to 
determine the exemption in that statute. In keeping with the purpose of this 
anti-abuse I.R.C. section and conceding the role of adverse selection, that 
interest should be the full value of the underlying property interest and not 
any split interest created, directly or indirectly, by a taxpayer when she re-
tains any split interest until her death. 
Proposal 2: When a transferor splits a property interest and retains an 
income interest under § 2036, except where the transferee pays full and ad-
equate consideration in money or money’s worth equal to the value of the 
                                                                                                                           
 57 These strategies divide a fee simple interest in property into different temporal interests. 
Although a fee simple interest is valued under a “facts and circumstances” approach, split interests 
must be valued by means of the actuarial tables. See I.R.C. § 2031 (2012) (defining gross estate); 
id. § 7520 (mandating use of valuation tables); Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2031-1(b), 25.2512-1 (2015) 
(creating rules for valuation of property included in the gross estate). If decedent has a terminal 
illness where there is a greater than 50% probability that she would die within one year, the actu-
arial tables cannot be used to value the split interests. Treas. Reg. § 20.7520-3(b)(3) (2015). 
Where, however, the taxpayer does not have a terminal illness, but has either overall poor health 
or a more slowly advancing illness or condition (such as some cancers or heart disease), he or she 
may split a fee interest in property and rely on the actuarial tables to determine valuation. Id. 
 58 136 CONG. REC. 30,485, 30,538 (1990). 
Based on average rates of return and life expectancy, those tables are seldom accu-
rate in a particular case, and therefore, may be the subject of adverse selection. Be-
cause the taxpayer decides what property to give, when to give it, and often controls 
the return on the property, use of Treasury tables undervalues the transferred inter-
ests in the aggregate, more often than not. 
Id. 
 59 By contrast, “[t]emporal interests are commonly created by gifts and bequests, often in 
trust, in family estate planning.” JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, 
STRUCTURE, AND POLICY 728 (4th ed. 2012). Note that in D’Ambrosio, only family members and 
a company owned by family members are parties to the transactions. Estate of D’Ambrosio, 105 
T.C. at 253–54. 
 60 I.R.C. § 2036. 
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underlying fee interest in the property, the date-of-death value of the under-
lying property is included in the decedent’s estate. 
C. Powers 
Some reform recommendations have included proposals to eliminate 
retained powers from inclusion in decedent’s estate.61 Such a change, how-
ever, would encourage transfer tax freezes, thereby eliminating dispropor-
tionate and substantial post-transfer appreciation from estate taxation. Con-
sequently, ignoring retained powers would sap § 2036(a)(2) and § 2038 of 
their anti-abuse protection. For the wealthiest of decedents—those who pos-
sess sufficient assets to meet their needs and desires—who want to transfer 
some assets to family members while at the same time retaining control of 
their transferred assets, retained power is actually often more important than 
the retention of those assets themselves.62 
In a recent article63 this author proposed the elimination of the five or 
five power rule under § 2514(e) for gift taxes because it is an unnecessary 
and complex de minimis provision and, when intertwined with Crummey64 
powers, is a fantastical story in its own right. Should that gift tax reform be 
enacted, eventually there would be no need for the companion estate tax 
provision under § 2041(b)(2).65 
                                                                                                                           
 61 See 2 DEP’T OF TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH 374–80 (1984) (discussing proposed changes to the estate tax and its treatment of re-
tained powers). 
 62 See Richard Schmalbeck, Avoiding Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes, in RETHINKING ES-
TATE AND GIFT TAXATION 113, 121–22 (William G. Gale et al. eds., 2001) (emphasizing the 
strong preference of potential donors for the retention of economic power); Wojciech Kopczuk, 
Economics of Estate Taxation: Review of Theory and Evidence, 63 TAX L. REV. 139, 154 (2009) 
(“Schmalbeck argues that most tax avoidance strategies require relinquishing control over assets, 
but that is something most taxpayers are reluctant to do.”). 
 63 Gerzog, supra note 4, at 199–200. 
 64 See supra notes 11–14 and accompanying text (discussing Crummey powers and ILITs).  
 65 I.R.C. § 2041(b)(2) (2012). Section 2041(b)(2) provides that a lapse will not be considered 
a release such as to cause the property to be included in decedent’s gross estate to the extent that 
the value of the property subject to the general power of appointment did not exceed the greater of 
$5000 or 5% of the aggregate value of the property subject to the power. Id. That is, in each year 
that the decedent, during his lifetime, allowed his power over the statutorily de minimis amount of 
property to lapse, if he also retained an interest or power over the property in the same way as if 
he had owned the property outright and then transferred and retained an interest or power under 
§ 2035 through § 2038, decedent would have a proportionate inclusion of the value of that proper-
ty in his estate. See Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2041-3(d)(3)–(5) (2015) (detailing rules related to lapse of a 
power of appointment). 
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II. REALITY-BASED VALUATION 
Too easily, taxpayers can game the valuation system to avoid paying 
the appropriate value of transfer taxes. In order to correct this situation, this 
Part proposes ways to move towards a more reality-based system of valua-
tion. Section A explores the inadequacy of using actuarial tables to value 
future interests, and argues that the value should be determined and taxed at 
distribution to the beneficiary at the highest transfer tax rate.66 Section B 
proposes that except in the case of an operating business, no discounts 
should be allowed to transfers of entity interests to family members with 
respect to any liquid assets transferred to that family entity.67 
A. The Limited Use of Actuarial Tables to Value Future Interests 
With respect to a taxpayer’s division of a fee interest into its temporal 
parts, the transfer taxes need to match the timing of taxation with the timing 
of possession and receipt of partial interests in that fee. That principle and 
new focus would drastically reduce the current reliance on the actuarial ta-
bles for the valuation of donor-decedent-created split interests. Although 
§ 7520 requires partial interests in property, such as remainders, to be val-
ued by the actuarial tables—which have the benefits of simplicity and his-
torical acceptance68—donor-decedent-created partial interests are the sub-
ject of disproportionate valuation manipulation and tax avoidance. Because 
a transferor decides if and when to employ an estate-planning strategy that 
relies on actuarial valuation (i.e., adverse selection), transferors naturally 
only opt to do so when the probabilities are skewed in their favor. Thus, a 
donor division of a fee interest into its temporal property interests makes the 
tables factually a non-neutral valuation tool.69 In order to correct this abuse, 
                                                                                                                           
 66 See infra notes 68–78 and accompanying text. 
 67 See infra notes 79–94 and accompanying text. 
 68 See Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 5031(a), 
102 Stat. 3342, 3668 (requiring use of the well-established valuation tables). Prior to the enact-
ment of that statute, the regulations required the use of the tables to value split interests. See Treas. 
Reg. § 20.2031-7(c) (2015) (indicating the applicable regulation and tables for valuing interests in 
a decedent’s estate from before January 1, 1952 to the present date); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-5(c) 
(2011) (actuarial tables also necessary to value partial interests for gift tax purposes). In the con-
text of the valuation of lottery winnings in a decedent’s estate, some courts have departed from the 
required use of the tables under I.R.C. § 7520 based on the rationale that the tables do not produce 
a realistic valuation. See generally Gerzog, supra note 56 (providing background on the issue of 
lottery winnings and actuary tables); Wendy C. Gerzog, The Lottery Cases and Ithaca Trust, 101 
TAX NOTES 289 (2003) (same); Wendy C. Gerzog, Valuation Discounting and the Lottery Cases, 
137 TAX NOTES 917 (2012) (same). 
 69 See Alternatives to the Current Federal Estate Tax System: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on Finance, 110th Cong. 1081 (2008) (statement of Joseph M. Dodge, Professor, Florida State 
University College of Law) (“Actuarial tables are not only inaccurate in individual cases, but can 
be ‘gamed’ by such devices as GRATs and private annuities.”). 
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a donor- or decedent-created remainder should be valued and taxed at the 
life tenant’s death. The value of that “future interest” can be accurately de-
termined when the beneficiary actually enjoys the property interest. 
At the 2015 Boston College Law School symposium, “The Centennial 
of the Estate and Gift Tax: Perspectives and Recommendations,” Martin 
Hall, President of the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel Foun-
dation, asked whether the tables could be modified to be more accurate in 
forecasting value.70 The author had thought about this issue and considered 
a few “solutions” in an earlier article on charitable split interests.71 Those 
solutions included requiring charitable lead annuity trust (“CLAT”) invest-
ments to be of a more predictable type, such as U.S. Treasury debt instru-
ments, or enacting a recapture provision for adjustments in value when a 
CLAT remainderman receives the property. 72 After the Symposium, this 
author considered specific options to correct the actuarial tables, such as 
increasing the § 7520(a)(2) multiplier from 120%, using the long-term in-
stead of the mid-term rate, or using some sort of historical weighted average 
interest rate to more accurately reflect the interest rates that are likely to 
arise in the future.73 Certainly, in the current anomalously long period of 
low interest rates, these suggestions would improve future prediction of 
value; however, they still are guesses at that value and not immune to gam-
ing. Nonetheless, value is most easily and accurately knowable by waiting 
until property is possessed by the recipient. 
The current proposal is, therefore, that with respect to a donor who di-
rectly or indirectly divides a fee interest into different temporal interests, the 
value of any future interest must be determined and taxed when received by 
the beneficiary.74 If the interest is in trust, whenever the future interest is 
possessed the trustee should be responsible for filing and paying the estate 
tax at the highest transfer tax rate before the property’s distribution to the 
                                                                                                                           
 70 Martin Hall, President, The Am. Coll. of Tr. & Estate Counsel Found., Opening Remarks at 
Boston College Law School and the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel Foundation 
Symposium: The Centennial of the Estate and Gift Tax: Perspectives and Recommendations (Oct. 
2, 2015). 
 71 See generally Wendy C. Gerzog, The Times They Are Not a-Changin’: Reforming the 
Charitable Split Interest Rules (Again), 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 849 (2010) (reviewing the history 
of the law pertaining to charitable split interests and proposing solutions to improve simplicity and 
curtail abuse). 
 72 Id. at 880–82. 
 73 The author discussed this issue with Alex G. Shaller, Fellow, Society of Actuaries, and 
Harry S. Cohen, Ph.D., Operations Research, M.I.T., and attributes these suggested solutions to 
them. 
 74 This proposal is similar to the one proposed by Professors Mitchell Gans and Jay Soled. 
See Mitchell M. Gans and Jay A. Soled, Reforming the Gift Tax and Making It Enforceable, 87 
B.U. L. REV. 759, 789–90 (2007) (proposing to treat GRATs and qualified personal residence 
trusts, or QPRTs, as incomplete gifts until the grantor’s interest terminates or, at the taxpayer’s 
option, to tax the full value of the property paid to the trust instead of only the remainder value). 
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beneficiary. Thus, the transfer taxation of a distribution of a future interest 
should parallel and replicate the taxation of a taxable termination in a gen-
eration-skipping transfer trust.75 By timing the valuation to the date of pos-
session, the real value of the property is known; by requiring the trustee to 
pay the transfer tax prior to distribution of the property, compliance rates 
should be high. By taxing the property at the highest transfer tax rate, there 
will be certainty, ease of calculation, and a further abuse deterrent. 
For example, when a grantor creates a grantor-retained annuity trust 
(“GRAT”) for a term of years, the determination of the value of any poten-
tial remainder gift would be determined at the end of the grantor’s annuity 
term. For zeroed-out short-term GRATs, if there is any payout after the re-
tained term to a beneficiary (e.g., because of the actual success of the in-
vestment or because the actual income produced during the term exceeded 
expectations), a transfer tax would then be imposed and paid by the trustee 
before distribution to any third party. 
The media have described how billionaires will have skirted hundreds of 
millions of dollars in estimated transfer taxes by means of GRATs.76 There-
fore, not surprisingly, since the U.S. Tax Court’s decision in Walton v. Com-
missioner in 2000, 77 there have been many suggestions to curtail the use of 
short-term zeroed-out GRATs.78 The Obama Administration’s proposals to 
                                                                                                                           
 75 See I.R.C. § 2611 (2012) (defining generation-skipping transfers); I.R.C. § 2612 (2012) 
(defining taxable terminations); I.R.C. § 2613 (2012) (defining skip persons). 
 76 See, e.g., Deborah L. Jacobs, Zuckerberg, Moskovitz Give Big Bucks to Unborn Kids, FORBES 
(Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/deborahljacobs/2012/03/07/facebook-billionaires-shifted-
more-than-200-million-gift-tax-free/#44f515e95614 [https://perma.cc/472K-XFH3] (explaining how 
Mark Zuckerberg, Dustin Moskovitz, and Sheryl Sandberg can use GRATs to make a combined 
$204,353,993 of tax-free transfers); Laura Saunders, How Facebook’s Elite Skirt Estate Tax, WALL 
STREET J. (May 11, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023045439045773959713
33422002 [https://perma.cc/Y5RE-9BPS] (discussing how using these devices and freezing values 
allow billionaires to avoid estimates of “about $100 million for Mr. Zuckerberg and more than $415 
million for Mr. Moskovitz”). 
 77 See generally Walton v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 589 (2000) (determining the valuation under 
§ 2702 of gifts resulting from petitioner’s creation of two GRATs), acq., 2003-2 C.B. 964. 
 78 See, e.g., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S 
FISCAL YEAR 2016 REVENUE PROPOSALS 197–99 (2015) (proposing GRATs have a minimum 
term of ten years and requiring the remainder interest to have a minimum value at the time of 
creation); Paul L. Caron & James R. Repetti, Revitalizing the Estate Tax: 5 Easy Pieces, 142 TAX 
NOTES 1231, 1240 (2014) (proposing a lifetime limit on GRATs). In particular, the Treasury pro-
posal stated: 
The proposal would require that a GRAT have a minimum term of ten years and a 
maximum term of the life expectancy of the annuitant plus ten years to impose some 
downside risk in the use of a GRAT. The proposal also would include a requirement 
that the remainder interest in the GRAT at the time the interest is created must have 
a minimum value equal to the greater of 25 percent of the value of the assets con-
tributed to the GRAT or $500,000 (but not more than the value of the assets contrib-
uted). In addition, the proposal would prohibit any decrease in the annuity during the 
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increase the § 2036 exposure by requiring a longer term for GRATs are an 
improvement to the current transfer tax treatment. The present proposal, how-
ever, would eliminate most of the present transfer tax benefits of employing a 
GRAT and would better reflect a reality-based approach to its use. 
Proposal 3: When a transferor directly or indirectly divides a fee interest 
into temporal interests, the value of any future interest shall be determined 
and taxed at distribution to the beneficiary at the highest transfer tax rate. 
B. Non-Business Family Entity Discounts 
Older generation family members create entities to which they transfer 
liquid assets like cash or marketable securities.79 In return they receive 
heavily discounted entity interests that are passed to younger generations.80 
In order to eliminate unwarranted and unreal lack-of-marketability81 and 
minority82 discounts accorded non-business entities, such as family limited 
partnerships and family limited liability companies, transfer taxes on trans-
fers of interests in those non-business entities should be assessed on the un-
discounted asset values represented by those transferred interests. The trans-
fer would need to be a “transfer of property made in the ordinary course of 
business (a transaction which is bona fide, at arm’s length, and free from 
any donative intent)” in order to be exempt from this valuation rule.83 
                                                                                                                           
GRAT term, and would prohibit the grantor from engaging in a tax-free exchange of 
any asset held in the trust. 
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra, at 198. 
 79 See Martha Britton Eller, Which Estates Are Affected by the Estate Tax?: An Examination 
of the Filing Population for Year-of-Death 2001, STAT. INCOME BULL., Summer 2005, at 1, 11–
12, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/01esyod.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8YB-NT74] (describing how 
older family members contribute assets to a family limited partnership which are in turn passed to 
younger generations). 
 80 See id. at 11 (noting the substantial discounts created by gifting interests in a family limited 
partnership). The transferred assets are discounted to values between 30% and 60% of their fair 
market value. 
 81 Because the entity or state law imposes restrictions on the transferability of such entity 
interests, gifts of those interests are normally entitled to lack-of-marketability discounts. Here, 
however, the underlying assets are freely marketable and are transferred to the entity for estate tax 
reduction, and not for business, purposes. Eliminating those transfer tax valuation benefits would 
result in the end of such transfers. 
 82 The values of those gifts are also normally entitled to a minority (lack of control) discount 
because holders of those interests cannot freely control the entity’s assets. But, in a non-business 
estate-planning context, there is no reason for these transfer tax valuation benefits either. See Es-
tate of Strangi v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 478, 495 (2000) (Parr, J., dissenting) (“If a hypothetical third 
party had offered to purchase the assets held by the partnership for the full fair market value of 
those assets, there is little doubt that decedent could have had the assets distributed to himself to 
complete the sale.”). 
 83 Estate of Bongard v. Comm’r, 124 T.C. 95, 145–47 (2005); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 
(2015). In Estate of Bongard v. Commissioner, Judge Halpern in a dissenting opinion stated that 
the proper focus of the bona fide sale exception is an economic calculus and not a motive inquiry. 
1054 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:1037 
In an earlier article, this author proposed prototype amendments to the 
regulations under I.R.C. § 2031.84 That article proposed modifying the fair 
market value definition where the parties are not acting as customary parties 
to a sale, i.e., where a seller intentionally devalues property for transfer tax 
valuation purposes.85 According to that proposal, “A buyer is one who is 
seeking to pay the lowest price for property and a seller is one who is seek-
ing to sell property at its highest price.”86 Except where the transfer falls 
under the “ordinary course of business exception” in the gift tax regulations, 
when a transferor has intentionally devalued his property, the normally ap-
plied fair market value definition in the estate tax regulations would not be 
used to value the devalued asset; instead, the asset’s value “must be deter-
mined without regard to the volitional acts of valuation depression.”87 A 
presumption of intent to devalue property would apply where the transferor 
converted liquid assets into illiquid ones and would be evidenced by associ-
ated gift-giving as well as the transferor’s ill health or age at or near the date 
of the volitional devaluation.88 
The IRS recently announced proposed regulations under § 2704(b) to 
close this tax avoidance strategy.89 Section 2704(b)(4) specifically provides 
for additional restrictions imposed by the regulations.90 Section 
2704(b)(3)(B), however, specifically excepts from the definition of an “ap-
                                                                                                                           
Estate of Bongard, 124 T.C. at 145–47 (Halpern, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Also in 
Estate of Bongard, Judge Laro asserted that the court should continue to apply the business pur-
pose test laid out in Gregory v. Helvering. Id. at 139 (Laro, J., concurring) (citing Gregory v. 
Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935)). In 2004, in Estate of Thompson v. Commissioner, the Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit cited to the business purpose test in Gregory. Estate of Thompson 
v. Comm’r, 382 F.3d 367, 383 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Gregory, 293 U.S. at 469)). 
 84 Wendy C. Gerzog, Valuation Discounting Techniques: Terms Gone Awry, 61 TAX LAW. 
775, 803–04 (2008) (proposing a new regulation, § 20.2031-1(c)). 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 803. 
 87 Id. at 803–04. 
 88 Id. 
 89 See Paul Sullivan, Navigating Tougher I.R.S. Rules for Family Partnerships, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/08/your-money/navigating-tougher-irs-rules-for-
family-partnerships.html?_r=1 (reporting on IRS plans to tighten rules related to tax avoidance by 
means of family partnerships); Letter from Ronald D. Aucutt, Past President, The Am. Coll. of Tr. 
& Estate Counsel Found., Capital Letter No. 38: Anticipated Valuation Discount Regulations (July 
20, 2015), http://www.actec.org/resources/capital-letter-no-38/ [https://perma.cc/BQF8-N6GZ] (dis-
cussing the history of I.R.C. § 2704(b) and forthcoming proposed regulations). 
 90 I.R.C. § 2704(b)(4) (2012). This section provides: 
The Secretary may by regulations provide that other restrictions shall be disregarded 
in determining the value of the transfer of any interest in a corporation or partner-
ship to a member of the transferor’s family if such restriction has the effect of reduc-
ing the value of the transferred interest for purposes of this subtitle but does not ul-
timately reduce the value of such interest to the transferee. 
Id. 
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plicable restriction” “any restriction imposed, or required to be imposed, by 
any Federal or State law.”91 That language has been the problem with en-
forcing this statute as the law was originally intended.92 Hopefully the pro-
posed regulations will find a successful way to avoid that issue. Alternative-
ly, the present suggestion is that this valuation issue is better addressed in 
new regulations under § 2031, which contains the fair market value defini-
tion and is not subject to any restriction like the one in § 2704(b)(3)(B).93 
Moreover, after much speculation about the § 2704(b) proposed regulations, 
the government has lowered expectations about their reach94 and, in fact, 
has not released them as of early 2016. 
Proposal 4: Except in the case an operating business, no discounts 
shall be allowed to transfers of entity interests to family members with re-
spect to any liquid assets transferred to that family entity. 
III. REALITY-BASED DEDUCTIONS 
Two of the most popular deductions under the I.R.C. can be warped to 
the point that they no longer operate in accordance with their underlying poli-
cies. The marital and charitable deductions have, over time, either been dilut-
ed by Congress or exploited by tax planners to create tax advantages that do 
not comport with reality. Thus, section A proposes changes to the application 
of the marital deduction, including the repeal of certain provisions.95 Section 
B offers alterations to the determination of the charitable deduction in order to 
refocus the deduction on the gift to the actual charity.96 
A. Marital Deduction 
Married taxpayers may take a marital deduction to defer estate and gift 
taxes on property that passes between them.97 Virtually all married couples 
                                                                                                                           
 91 Id. § 2704(b)(3)(B). 
 92 See Kerr v. Comm’r, 113 T.C. 449, 473 (1999) (holding in favor of the taxpayer because 
the partnership agreements’ liquidation restriction “was no more restrictive than the limitations 
that generally would apply to the partnerships under Texas law”), aff’d, 202 F.3d 490 (5th Cir. 
2002). 
 93 See supra notes 84–88 and accompanying text (detailing the author’s proposal for new 
regulations under § 2031). 
 94 See William R. Davis, Valuation Discount Rules to Rely on Statute, Not Obama Proposal, 
TAX NOTES (Nov. 6, 2015), http://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today/estate-gift-and-inheritance-
taxes/valuation-discount-rules-rely-statute-not-obama-proposal/2015/11/06/17526161 [https://perma.
cc/8E23-YYUX] (noting tempered expectations for the proposed regulations). 
 95 See infra note 97–109 and accompanying text. 
 96 See infra note 110–114 and accompanying text. 
 97 I.R.C. § 2056 (2012). Congress enacted the marital deduction in 1948 in order to give mar-
ried couples in common law states tax benefits comparable to the tax benefits available in com-
munity property law jurisdictions. Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, § 361, 62 Stat. 110, 
117–21; H.R. REP. NO. 1274-80, at 21–26 (1948); S. REP. NO. 1013-80, at 22–29 (1948). For the 
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and almost half of all decedents use and benefit from the marital deduction, 
which costs the government billions of dollars in current revenue.98 Since 
its enactment in 1981,99 the qualified terminable interest property (“QTIP”) 
marital deduction trust has become the most popular form of the marital 
deduction.100 The QTIP provisions are an exception to the marital deduction 
terminable interest rule.101 Unlike the terminable interest exception for a 
qualifying income interest coupled with a general power of appointment, 
the QTIP exception allows the predeceasing spouse to receive the benefits 
of a marital deduction without ceding control or ownership of the trans-
ferred property to the surviving spouse. The fiction of the QTIP as a marital 
transfer is intrinsically abusive.102 It also results in a significant current rev-
enue loss.103 
                                                                                                                           
next twenty-eight years, Congress made only minor revisions to the marital deduction provisions, 
e.g., it amended § 812(e) so that life estates as well as income interests in a trust would qualify for 
the marital deduction where they were combined with a general power of appointment in the sur-
viving spouse. See JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 83D CONG., SUMMARY OF 
THE NEW PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954 (H.R. 8300), at 115 (Comm. 
Print 1955) (explaining a 1954 amendment expanding marital deductions). In 1976, however, in 
order to allow married persons to transfer small or moderate estates to each other tax free, Con-
gress increased the estate tax marital deduction to the greater of $250,000 or one half of the dece-
dent’s adjusted gross estate. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2002(a)(1)(A), 90 
Stat. 1520, 1854; H.R. REP. NO. 1380-94, at 17 (1976). At the same time and for substantially the 
same reason, Congress expanded the gift tax marital deduction to shield the first $100,000 of in-
terspousal gifts as well as 50% of such gifts above $200,000. Tax Reform Act of 1976 § 2002(b), 
(d)(2) (amending I.R.C. § 2523(a) (1954)). Between 1976 and 1981, Congress again made only 
minor revisions in the marital deduction provisions. 
 98 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., STATISTICS OF INCOME: ESTATE TAX STATISTICS, https://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/10esesttaxsnap.pdf [https://perma.cc/KJC6-V562]. Using data from estate 
tax returns filed in 2009, statistics indicate that “97 percent of the estates of married decedents, 
and 48 percent of estates overall, reported deductions for marital bequests, for a total of $42 bil-
lion.” Id. Additionally, “[o]nly 9 percent of estates with a marital bequest owed estate tax.” Id. 
 99 Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA), Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 403(d)(1), 95 Stat. 
172, 302–03. QTIP is the acronym for “qualified terminable interest property,” which is defined as 
property: (1) which passes from the decedent, (2) in which the surviving spouse has a qualifying 
income interest for life, and (3) to which an election under this paragraph applies. I.R.C. 
§§ 2056(b)(7)(B)(i), 2523(f)(2) (2012); Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2056(b)-7(b), 25.2523(f)-1(b) (2015). 
 100 See Ira Mark Bloom, The Treatment of Trust and Other Partial Interests of the Surviving 
Spouse Under the Redesigned Elective-Share System: Some Concerns and Suggestions, 55 ALB. 
L. REV. 941, 955 (1992) (offering an example applicable to “both the multiple-marriage society 
phenomenon and the popularity of QTIP dispositions”); Joseph M. Dodge, A Deemed Realization 
Approach Is Superior to Carryover Basis (and Avoids Most of the Problems of the Estate and Gift 
Tax), 54 TAX L. REV. 421, 466 (2001) (“In estates of the well-off, the most popular form of mari-
tal bequest is the QTIP trust . . . .”). 
 101 See Dodge, supra note 100, at 464–65. 
 102 See generally Wendy C. Gerzog, The Marital Deduction QTIP Provisions: Illogical and 
Degrading to Women, 5 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 301 (1995) (describing the flaws with QTIPs). 
 103 See supra note 92 and accompanying text (noting that the government has had difficulty 
enforcing I.R.C. § 2704(b)). 
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In order to make the marital deduction reflective of a purely marital 
and not third-party transfer, the QTIP provisions and the reverse-QTIP elec-
tion generation-skipping tax (“GST”) provision104 should be repealed. The 
main features of this proposal are outlined elsewhere,105 but essentially the 
power of appointment (“PAT”) trust form would be amended to be a 
strengthened equivalent of outright ownership so that only outright transfers 
or a strengthened power of appointment trust transfer would qualify for the 
tax deferral benefits of the marital deduction.106 That is, only where the do-
nee or recipient spouse actually has control over, and an ownership interest 
in, the transferred property is the donor spouse entitled to a transfer tax mar-
ital deduction.107 In addition, the proposal provides for amending the PAT 
and the GST provisions in order to preserve the computational flexibility 
currently afforded the QTIP provisions, which assist the taxpayer in receiv-
ing the full use of exemptions, including both federal and state estate tax 
benefits where applicable.108 
The rationale for this change is that the marital deduction should only 
be available where both spouses have equivalent ownership of “their” prop-
erty. That was the underpinning for the unlimited marital deduction.109 The 
QTIP provisions, however, encourage spouses to transfer less than a full 
property interest to their mates by providing the donors with a marital de-
duction based on the value of the underlying property, although they actual-
ly give their spouses only a lifetime income interest in that property. The 
marital deduction was intended to cover actual transfers of a fee property 
interest between spouses and was not intended for transfers of limited in-
                                                                                                                           
 104 I.R.C. § 2652(a)(3) (2012). 
 105 See generally Wendy C. Gerzog, The New Super-Charged PAT (Power of Appointment 
Trust), 48 HOUS. L. REV. 507 (2011) (critiquing the QTIP and proposing to weaken the QTIP in 
favor of a PAT form of marital deduction). 
 106 See id. at 539–42 (describing the benefits of creating a “super-charged” PAT). 
 107 See id. (explaining the structure of a “super-charged” PAT). 
 108 Id. 
 109 In 1981, besides enacting the QTIP provision exception to the terminable interest rule, 
Congress enacted the unlimited marital deduction. I.R.C. § 2056(a). ERTA also repealed I.R.C. 
§ 2056(c) (1954), which contained the dollar and percentage limitations placed on the deduction. 
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 § 403(a)(1)(A). The unlimited marital deduction reflected a 
decision to treat a husband and wife as one unit for the purposes of transfer taxation. S. REP. NO. 
97-144, at 127 (1981). That decision paralleled the choice of the married couple as the proper unit 
for income taxation and solidified the concept that a husband and wife’s property is really “theirs.” 
See id. The ALI recommended the unlimited marital deduction as a way that married couples, in 
transferring property to others, could take full advantage of both spouses’ lower transfer tax 
brackets. See AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION: RECOMMENDATIONS 
ADOPTED BY THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE AND REPORTERS’ STUDIES 32–33 (1968) (propos-
ing a 100% marital deduction); see also Joseph Isenbergh, Simplifying Retained Life Interests, 
Revocable Transfers, and the Marital Deduction, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 31 (1984) (“Viewed 
broadly, the unlimited marital deduction has the effect of treating spouses as a single taxpayer 
with a lifetime equal to the survivor’s.”). 
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come interests to a spouse (hence, the nondeductible terminable interest 
rule). In order to preserve that original intention and not marginalize the 
recipient spouse, the QTIP statute should be repealed. 
Proposal 5: Repeal the QTIP statute and replace it with a PAT, modi-
fied to allow for both a reverse PAT and a state-only PAT election. 
B. Charitable Deduction 
There are numerous policy reasons for giving preferential tax treat-
ment to charitable donations.110 Unfortunately, those tax benefits can be 
realized by individuals who do not share the purpose of charitable deduc-
tions. The charitable deduction should be allowed only where the deduction 
primarily benefits a charity and not where a split-interest transfer to a chari-
ty is designed to benefit mainly the non-charitable beneficiary. Yet, this 
skewed focus is touted by charities and estate planners to encourage the use 
of a CLAT. In a CLAT, the value of the gratuitous transfer to the charity is 
secondary. Instead, a CLAT is promoted with such labels as “Charitable 
Lead Trusts for the Noncharitably Inclined.”111 
Under current law, instead of making a direct gift of a remainder inter-
est to a family member, more value can pass to a beneficiary free of transfer 
tax by incorporating a charitable donation into the transfer. A CLAT is the 
preferred strategy to use for this result because “the annuity remains fixed 
and more property can go [untaxed] to the family beneficiaries.”112 Donors 
are enticed by the charity’s advertisements of the CLAT as a “‘powerful 
tool,’ as a device that results ‘in little or no taxes,’ and more.”113 The CLAT 
                                                                                                                           
 110 See Miranda Perry Fleischer, Libertarianism and the Charitable Tax Subsidies, 56 B.C. L. 
REV. 1345, 1351–54 (2015) (providing a brief summary of several policy rationales for subsidizing 
charitable donations through the tax code). 
 111 KATHRYN G. HENKEL, ESTATE PLANNING AND WEALTH PRESERVATION: STRATEGIES 
AND SOLUTIONS ¶ 35.09 (abridged student ed. 2003). As one scholar stated, 
If the donor is not actually charitably inclined, but is simply interested in transfer-
ring property to his descendants in the least costly way, a comparison can be made 
between the amount the family beneficiaries would have as remainder beneficiaries 
of the CLT and the amount they would have as recipients of an outright gift of the 
initial value of the remainder interest in the CLT. Under this comparative analysis, 
the CLT gets more money to the beneficiaries if the property actually earns more 
than the 7520 rate, and vice versa. 
Id. 
 112 Id. ¶ 35.08. 
 113 Outside the Box on Estate Tax Reform: Reviewing Ideas to Simplify Planning: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 110th Cong. 38 (2008) (statement of Diana Aviv, President & 
CEO, Independent Sector). Describing the powerful tax incentive CLATs create, one practitioner 
explained: 
Take, for example, a donor who wants to set up a 10-year CLAT and zero out the 
gift to the remainder beneficiaries . . . . Assuming a section 7520 rate of 3.4% (May 
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achieves this benefit because the non-charitable interest is valued and taxed 
under current law when the CLAT is created, and that valuation is based on 
the actuarial tables that routinely undervalue the remainder interest and ig-
nore the actual growth and income of the investment in the trust.114 
Therefore, in order to refocus the charitable deduction on the gift to the 
charity, either the CLAT provisions should be repealed or the non-charitable 
interest should be valued and taxed at the time it is actually received by the 
beneficiary. In that way, the CLAT transferor would pay his or her fair share 
of transfer taxes for that part of the CLAT transfer that solely benefits the 
non-charitable beneficiary. 
Proposal 6: When the property is distributed to the non-charitable do-
nee in a CLAT, the trustee shall pay a transfer tax, at the highest transfer tax 
rate, from trust assets at distribution. 
CONCLUSION 
Reforming the estate tax requires transforming the estate tax into a 
more reality-based tax. In so doing, the estate tax will eliminate most of the 
abuses that have become rampant in the current estate tax regime. The es-
tate tax should apply to inherently testamentary transfers and should reject 
unreal valuation discounts and actuarial valuation gaming. On the deduction 
side, a reformed estate tax should make the marital deduction more intra-
spousal and should make the charitable deduction mainly a benefit for the 
charity. 
                                                                                                                           
2010), this donor could set up a 10-year CLAT with a steady annuity of $598,179 
per year. In other words, a contribution of $5 million to the CLAT would provide a 
$5 million income tax deduction and a zero taxable gift. Assuming an after-tax 
growth rate of 6%, $1,069,762 would be left in the trust at the end of the trust term 
to be distributed to beneficiaries. 
Scott E. Testa, Charitable Planning: CRTs, CLTs and the Increasing Payment CLAT, J. ACCT. (July 
1, 2010), http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2010/jul/20102678.html [https://perma.cc/
L8WV-YWHF]. 
 114 See Wendy C. Gerzog, From the Greedy to the Needy, 87 OR. L. REV. 1133, 1164–67 
(2009) (explaining the tax benefits of a CLT and CLATs); Gerzog, supra note 71, at 877 (same). 
  
 
 
